After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various sources of law (...) to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process. (shrink)

This article provides an assessment of the merits of recent theories of legal reasoning. After a quick historical aperçu a number of models of legal argumentation are presented and discussed, with an eye to their mutual connection. An initial conclusion is that universalizability and discursivity are the common features of those models. The focal question dealt with, however, is that of the impact of the argumentative paradigms of adjudication on the very concept of law. Here the contention is that an (...) argumentative style of reasoning contributes to rendering the structure of the law itself and its operations argumentative as well. By so doing the latter are—so to say—civilized and made less truculent. They will thus be able to develop more in conformity with a democratic form of life. (shrink)

Law seems to be irremediadibly connected to the experience of coercion and to a structure of hierarchy. This is so because it has traditionally been defined as a set of authoritative prescriptions, usually commands backed by the menace of a sanction, an evil eventually applied through the use of overwhelming violence. Law has also been related to some kind of structure or system which is intrinsically hierarchical, both in the sense of the hierarchy of people whose conduct is addressed by (...) the law and in the sense of the logical interdependence of the legal prescriptions themselves. The British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart criticizes in his celabrated book The Concept of Law powerfully the command theory and also reshapes the theory of the hierarchical structure of rules. The paper will tries to follow Hart’s attack to the traditional imperativistic view and will then focus on his treatment of international law. The aim is to show on the one side how promising Hart’s approach could be, and on the other side how poor however his conceptualization of international law at the end of the day reveals to be. (shrink)

Le droit est traditionnellement lié à la pratique du commandement et de la hiérarchie. Il semble qu’une règle juridique établisse une immédiate relation entre une norme supérieure et une norme inférieure. La conception hiérarchique et impérative peut néanmoins être remise en cause dès lors que la phénoménologie de la règle juridique est appréhendée d’un point de vue interne, celui de ceux que l’on peut considérer comme les « utilisateurs » de la règle plutôt que ceux qui la subissent. Une approche (...) tournée vers la pratique pourrait, de cette façon, conduire à une théorie du droit plus ouverte et, d’une certaine façon, moins idéologique ou sectaire. C’est – comme le défend cet article – le programme ou mieux la promesse que l’on trouve dans l’ouvrage principal de Hart, le Concept de droit. Cet article tente de rendre cette promesse plus transparente sans toutefois dissimuler les difficultés de sa stratégie narrative et argumentative. (shrink)

La presente contribución recoge el diálogo mantenido entre distintos filósofos del Derecho a propósito de la última obra del Profesor Massimo La Torre “Il diritto contro se stesso. Saggio sul positivismo giuridico e la sua crisi”. Al hilo del trabajo del citado autor, los participantes reflexionan sobre preguntas centrales para la teoría y filosofía del Derecho contemporánea: ¿cuál es la naturaleza del Derecho? ¿es el razonamiento jurídico eminentemente moral? ¿qué lugar debe ocupar la práctica jurídica en su conceptualización? ¿qué lugar (...) ocupa la fuerza en el Derecho? (shrink)

ABSTRACT: After World War Two a gigantic effort was made in order to build a viable and stable international order, beginning with the Bretton Woods agreement that was aimed to stabilize the international monetary system, and with the United Nations, that were intended to restore legality in interstate affairs and somehow initiate a cosmopolitan conversation among Nation States. This order is now slowly crumbling down, paradoxically through globalization, and a triumphant neoliberalism. A new, but indeed quite old narrative, rather a (...) myth, of what a national identity means is again getting the upper hand.KEYWORDS: international relations, international law, European Union, globalization, national identity. (shrink)

La caída del Muro de Berlín fue saludado por muchos analistas y académicos como el inicio de una nueva era. Con el fin de la Guerra Fría se vislumbraba una nueva etapa de paz y prosperidad. Tras la “revolución liberal” algunos avistaban el “fin de la historia”. Pero tal esperanza se disipó rápidamente: la desaparición del “socialismo real” relanzó un capitalismo desenfrenado y no sólo en los países ayer bajo la órbita soviética. El ordoliberalismo entendido como el establecimiento de un (...) modelo económico altamente competitivo y garantizado jurisdiccionalmente, se infiltró también en las instituciones europeas. La crisis del año 2010 vino a confirmar para Europa su deriva neoliberal, tecnocrática. La onda expansiva del 9 de noviembre de 1989 aún no ha concluido. Nuevas turbulencias aguardan. El Brexit también puede interpretarse en esta clave, como una empresa más de demolición, “liquidación”, “liberalización”. (shrink)

This is an attempt to conceptualize freedom beyond the now traditional opposition beetween a negative and a positive notion. To this purpose several weaknesses of the idea of negative freedom are pointed out and taken into account, while positive freedom is reinterpreted in terms of a social capacity, without reference however to romantic self-affirmation. Freeedom is thus seen connected with the question of power and authority, whose main theories are then shortly assessed. Among these the so-called „service conception“ is the (...) object of a more detailed discussion. The outcome will be a proposal to make it possible to understand freedom as a special enabling position with regard to authority. (shrink)

A permanent approach to what law is has been that of interpreting it in terms of repression or reduction of chances or courses of conduct. This approach, however, is not able to render justice to fundamental moments of the legal practice, beginning with constitutional law and its empowering rules. Nonetheless, the mainstream in the philosophy of law and in the legal theory has not at all been worried about this strange inadequacy of imperativism to offer a complete view of legal (...) practice and legal institutions. Force, violence, sanction, prescription still are the basic conceptual knots used to weave the cloth of law and lawyers. Hannah Arendt perceptive though scanty remarks on law, within her wider reflections on action and judgment, offer a different view and open a new path for a jurisprudence less obsessed with coercion, and against the tradition supporting the centrality of command in the tlegal domain. Such view and that path this paper tries sympathetically to explore. (shrink)

My paper consists of four sections. The first is concerned with the distinction and connection between fundamental and human rights. Here I shall just introduce a few conceptual notions and definitions that are more or less widely used, but that may help us to frame the issue and better focus on the most relevant question of the foundation or justification of human rights. In the second and third sections I will present what I believe to be the four fundamental normative (...) situations that shape our understanding and use of human rights. In the second section attention will focus on what in my opinion is the most basic of these four normative situations, which I call the “existential” situation. This is intended to offer a strong foundation for human rights as “not metaphysical,” without appealing to or relying on heavy metaphysical assumptions. I will try to stick more or less to an argumentative strategy based on common sense. The third section, dealing with the three other normative situations, will to some extent be an exercise in eclecticism, trying to combine different approaches to (and schools of thought on) the question of normativity. Here eclecticism will not be trivial, or at least I hope not. In the fourth and final section I will briefly conclude with a general overview on the issue of the “existence” of normativity and human rights. (shrink)

Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 92-100.

There are few problems to which legal philosophers have devoted more attention than the relationship between morality and law, or, said in different terms, between the “good” and the “obligatory”. One might think that all that should and could be said about it has already been uttered or written. Nevertheless philosophy — and legal philosophy is no exception — is just this: rethinking old problems which are in fact always new,1 and for which no definitive solution is given — nor (...) is possible, I would add — and which need a permanent effort of reassessment. There is no reason for disappointment or despair in this endless work. It is neither pointless nor irrelevant. (shrink)

This paper discusses some models purported to legitimise a European supranational legal order. In particular, the author focuses on an application of the so‐called regulatory model to the complex structure of the European Community and the European Union. First of all, he tackles the very concept of legitimacy, contrasting it with both efficacy and efficiency. Secondly, he summarises the most prominent positions in the long‐standing debate on the sources of legitimation for the European Community. Thirdly, in this perspective, he analyses (...) several, sometimes contradictory, notions of the rule of law. His contention is that we can single out five fundamental notions of the rule of law and that some but not all of them are incompatible with or oppose democracy. Finally, the paper addresses the regulatory model as a possible application of the rule of the law to the European supranational order. The conclusion is that the regulatory model should be rejected if it is presented as an alternative to classical democratic thought, though it might be fruitful if reshaped differently and no longer assessed from a functionalist standpoint of deliberation. (shrink)